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  • 标题:Corporate Governance Practice and Accounting Conservatism Level of Malaysian Listed Construction Companies
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Faiz Che'lah ; Amrizah Kamaluddin ; Nor Farizal Mohammed
  • 期刊名称:Academy of Strategic Management Journal
  • 印刷版ISSN:1544-1458
  • 出版年度:2021
  • 卷号:20
  • 期号:6
  • 页码:1-18
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:The DreamCatchers Group, LLC
  • 摘要:Purpose: The aim of the study is to examine whether corporate governance practices namely CEO duality, board size, board independence and audit committee with financial expertise in Malaysian Listed Construction Companies, are associated with the level of accounting conservatism. Prior studies have recognized accounting conservatism as a fundamental feature of quality reporting and corporate governance as a monitoring mechanism. Methodology/Methodology/Approach: This study employs quantitative approach by analyzing 48 Malaysian listed construction companies for the period of 2015 to 2019, giving out to 152 observations. The accrual-based model is applied to measure accounting conservatism that serves as independent variable. Findings: The results show that board size and the number of audit committee with financial expertise are negatively related to the level of accounting conservatism. The results demonstrate that smaller board size is more effectively in monitoring the outcome of financial statements, while having more audit committee with financial expertise reduces the level of accounting conservatism. This is an interesting finding that questions the effectiveness of role played by independent directors and audit committee in Malaysia. The findings of this study contribute to the literature of corporate governance and accounting conservatism, by giving insights for the enhancement of corporate governance mechanism in ensuring accountability in financial reporting of companies. Indeed, this study paves avenue for further research in quality reporting and governance.
  • 关键词:Accounting Conservatism;Corporate Governance;Agency Cost;Information Asymmetry
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