摘要：This article assesses different sides of the nuclear deterrence debate by examining opposing narratives supporting the relative simplicity versus complexity of maintaining deterrence.* The “easy deterrence” narrative posits that the essential requirements for stable mutual deterrence are not difficult to understand or meet and that the functioning of mutual deterrence can be considered largely predictable and reliable. In sharp contrast to this easy deterrence narrative, the alternative narrative envisions deterrence as difficult to establish and sustain and potentially requiring greater nuclear capabilities, contingency planning, and for some, strategic defensive capabilities. This article emphasizes the speculative nature of predictions about deterrence but suggests that the “difficult deterrence” narrative, with its recommended spectrum of deterrence threat options and focus on credibility, seems the most prudent in the contemporary threat environment. While the easy deterrence narrative has considerable confidence in deterrence because all rational or sensible leaders are expected to be cautious when confronted with a threat of societal destruction, the difficult deterrence narrative contends that such an expectation may be a “fatal error.” Difficult deterrence offers neither a definitive solution to the threat of nuclear use nor ease. It offers no cooperative global transformation and disarmament or confidence that deterrence will work easily and predictably across time. Instead, the difficult deterrence narrative confronts a dilemma that the easy deterrence concept avoids.
