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  • 标题:VALORES NA CIÊNCIA: DEVEMOS DAR ADEUS À IMPARCIALIDADE
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:CLAUDIO RICARDO MARTINS DOS REIS ; CLAUDIO RICARDO MARTINS DOS REIS
  • 期刊名称:Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology
  • 印刷版ISSN:1414-4247
  • 电子版ISSN:1808-1711
  • 出版年度:2021
  • 卷号:25
  • 期号:2
  • 页码:199-218
  • DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2021.e80526
  • 语种:Portuguese
  • 出版社:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil
  • 摘要:Considero epistêmica e socialmente necessário defender a racionalidade da ciência. Se negamos essa racionalidade, perdemos os meios para distinguir o conhecimento científico da mera opinião. No entanto, também considero epistêmica e socialmente necessário evitar o cientificismo. A ciência não é a única atividade racional, e o conhecimento científico não é infalível nem universal. Porém, uma vez admitida a racionalidade da ciência, como podemos explicá-la.
  • 其他摘要:In the first half of the 20th century, philosophers of science used to sustain that the correct theory acceptance in science derived from their conforming to certain rules. However, from the historicist and practical turn in the philosophy of science, the theory acceptance started to be analyzed based on values rather than on a priori established rules. In this article, I will present four paradigmatic positions on the role of values in science. The first position, articulated by Hugh Lacey, defends a regulative ideal of ‘impartiality’ in the acceptance of scientific theories as established. The other positions convey arguments that seem to conflict with this ideal. I characterize them as ‘blind spot argument’, ‘inductive risk argument’ and ‘trust-based acceptance argument’. Based on this analysis, I will defend two main theses. My first thesis is that the ideal of impartiality is compatible with the arguments just mentioned. My second thesis is that the defense of impartiality has the advantage of providing a support for the epistemic authority of properly established scientific knowledge. Following Lacey, I will argue that theories can only be accepted as established under specified domains of phenomena. However, theories are accepted for other purposes, for example, when they are adopted to develop research or when they are endorsed to inform the legitimacy of an action. In such cases of theory acceptance, impartiality is neither possible nor desirable, which requires the support of other ideals.
  • 其他关键词:trust-based acceptance;Hugh Lacey;impartiality;blind spots;inductive risk
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