摘要：The project was doomed to fail for several reasons. There was no commitment from the political authority. The government was kicking the can for a while. Fully aware of Navy and Air Force resistance to accept a large chunk of defense budget going to the new Corps at their expense, the government sent the matter to Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) for more deliberations. It was hoping that the food fight among three services would take the burden of decision for a while. Government approved it hastily in the aftermath of May 2013 Depsang crisis to deflect criticism chiefly from army partisans that it was gambling on national security. The exorbitant cost of over $3 billion was unrealistic and Indian political authorities who tightly hold the purse strings of defense budget were hesitant from the start. Even within the army, it was not thoroughly evaluated by looking closely at strategic, tactical, operational and financial aspects..
