摘要：Problems such as the reduction of the added value of agricultural products and the interruption of the supply of agricultural products caused by the unstable collaborative relationship have seriously hindered the high-quality development of the agricultural product supply chain. Promoting the stable collaboration in the agricultural product supply chain is an urgent problem. Considering the characteristic demand of consumers for agricultural products, this paper takes the supply chain mainly operating characteristic agricultural products and dominated by farmer cooperatives as the research object and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of farmer cooperatives, manufacturers, and retailers. We study the supply chain collaboration mechanism from the main strategy choice and the specific factors affecting its strategy choice. The results show that farmer cooperatives implement a strict supervision strategy and increase the reward and punishment to promote the collaboration in the supply chain, but the increase in supervision cost is not conducive to the income of farmer cooperatives. In the case of loose supervision, the difference between the additional income and the collaboration input is higher than the “free-rider” income obtained when adopting a non-collaboration strategy, which is conducive to its evolution towards collaboration. In addition, increasing additional income, improving synergy coefficient, and reducing collaboration input and “free-rider” income will increase the probability of the system evolving to Pareto optimal, and accelerate the realization of comprehensive collaboration in the agricultural product supply chain dominated by farmer cooperatives. The research results provide a certain supplement to the related research on agricultural product supply chains in theory, and provide a reference for the comprehensive collaboration of the agricultural product supply chain dominated by farmer cooperatives in practice.
