摘要：In this paper, an evolutionary game model for the development of panic buying events in COVID-19 is constructed by studying the dynamic process of the public and the government adjusting their strategic choices and playing a continuous game. This paper uses regret theory to depict the public’s perceived value of the items in the panic buying situation, describes the characteristics of each stage of the rumors spreading process and the evolution process of panic buying events, and introduces the variable of public critical ability to measure the public’s panic buying willingness. The results show that the government’s intervention measures according to the characteristics of different stages can effectively control the continuous fermentation time and influence the scope of panic buying events. The implementation of the government’s rumor-refutation strategy will also significantly affect the volume of public panic buying, which will help the government timely understand the public’s epidemic prevention needs in COVID-19, relieve public panic, and provide a basis for the effective management and scheduling of emergency supplies.
