期刊名称：American Journal of Industrial and Business Management
印刷版ISSN：2164-5167
电子版ISSN：2164-5175
出版年度：2015
卷号：05
期号：04
页码：226-234
DOI：10.4236/ajibm.2015.54025
语种：English
出版社：Scientific Research Publishing
摘要：The co-principal-anent models of manufacturer and retailer are built under the complete information and asymmetric information. In addition, the optimal profit sharing and the optimal fixed payment ratio are analyzed and compared in both situations. A motivate mechanism about service effort provided by the manufacturer towards the retailer in a dual-channel supply chain is studied. It implies that the profit of manufacturer under asymmetric information decreases dramatically contrasted to complete information and the retailer can gain profits by providing lower services, thus refusing deficiency of the supply chain.
关键词：Supply Chain; Service Differentiation; Dual-Channel; Incentive Mechanism
