首页    期刊浏览 2024年11月28日 星期四
登录注册

文章基本信息

  • 标题:Eliciting Taxpayer Preferences Increases Tax Compliance
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Jan-Emmanuel De Neve ; Cait Lamberton ; Michael I. Norton
  • 期刊名称:CEP Discussion Paper
  • 出版年度:2014
  • 卷号:2014
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Centre for Economic Performance
  • 摘要:Two experiments show that eliciting taxpayer preferences on government spending—providing taxpayer agency--increases tax compliance. We first create an income and taxation environment in a laboratory setting to test for compliance with a lab tax. Allowing a treatment group to express nonbinding preferences over tax spending priorities, leads to a 16% increase in tax compliance. A followup online study tests this treatment with a simulation of paying US federal taxes. Allowing taxpayers to signal their preferences on the distribution of government spending, results in a 15% reduction in the stated take-up rate of a questionable tax loophole. Providing taxpayer agency recouples tax payments with the public services obtained in return, reduces general anti-tax sentiment, and holds satisfaction with tax payment stable despite increased compliance with tax dues. With tax noncompliance costing the US government $385billion annually, providing taxpayer agency could have meaningful economic impact. At the same time, giving taxpayers a voice may act as a two-way 'nudge,' transforming tax payment from a passive experience to a channel of communication between taxpayers and government.
  • 关键词:Tax compliance;taxpayer agency;taxpayer satisfaction;government spending
国家哲学社会科学文献中心版权所有