期刊名称：Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science - Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：2734-9314
电子版ISSN：2734-9586
出版年度：2011
卷号：1
期号：1
页码：39-46
DOI：10.46223/HCMCOUJS.econ.en.1.1.113.2011
语种：English
出版社：HO CHI MINH CITY OPEN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF SCIENCE
摘要：This paper explores eBay auction properties that match buyers and sellers and generates millions of sales every month. eBay’s auction is now a well known mechanism designed to make buyers and sellers feel comfortable doing business without meeting each other. In a theoretical point of view, the current matching algorithm has not solved the online auction problems because the main conditions of agents’ preferences do not satisfy when bidders are unobservable and a set of bidders is not identified. Therefore, we construct a new simplified model of matching with a given object for sale to form a seller-bidder pair to overcome the online auction issues. Specially, our model may extend for the matching mechanism of the job market.
