期刊名称：Cardiff Economics Working Papers / Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
印刷版ISSN：1749-6101
出版年度：2018
期号：23
语种：English
出版社：Cardiff University
摘要：We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, preceded by a round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that the players are overall truthful about their types in the cheap-talk phase in both one-way and two-way talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when the players fully reveal their information; however, they achieve higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination.
关键词：Battle of the Sexes;Private Information;Cheap talk;Coordination
