期刊名称：Cardiff Economics Working Papers / Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
印刷版ISSN：1749-6101
出版年度：2014
期号：24
语种：English
出版社：Cardiff University
摘要：We consider the well-analyzed abatement game (Barrett 1994) and prove that correlation among the players (nations) can strictly improve upon the Nash equilibrium payoffs. As these games are potential games, correlated equilibrium — CE — (Aumann 1974, 1987) cannot improve upon Nash,however we prove that coarse correlated equilibria — CCE — (Moulin and Vial 1978) may do so. We compute the largest feasible total utility and hence the efficiency gain in any CCE in those games: it is achieved by a lottery over only two pure strategy profiles.
关键词：Abatement game;Coarse correlated equilibrium;Efficiency gain
