期刊名称：Cardiff Economics Working Papers / Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
印刷版ISSN：1749-6101
出版年度：2018
期号：25
语种：English
出版社：Cardiff University
摘要：This study presents a model in which interest groups compete for partially exclusive rents and the number of winners is stochastic. Partial exclusivity can explain the low empirical estimates of rent dissipation that create the Tullock paradox. However, partial exclusivity also increases aggregate effort and social waste. This study includes an empirical analysis of U.S. state-level lobbying expenditures, which reveals another puzzle regarding the constant relationship between aggregate expenditures and the number of spenders. In contrast to the existing rent-seeking contest models, this outcome is consistent with partially exclusive rents when the contest is designed by a rent-seeking maximising policymaker.
