期刊名称：Cardiff Economics Working Papers / Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
印刷版ISSN：1749-6101
出版年度：2021
期号：5
语种：English
出版社：Cardiff University
摘要：This paper presents an institutional model to investigate the cooperation between a government and a central bank. The former selects the monetary policy and then delegates the organization of macroprudential policy to the latter. Their policy stances are the result of sequential constrained utility maximization. Using indirect inference, we find a set of coefficients that can capture the UK policy stances for 1993-2016. This suggests post-crisis regulation has been overly intrusive. Finally, we show that this regulatory dilemma can be avoided by committing to a highly stabilizing monetary regime that uses QE extensively.
关键词：Bank regulation;Financial stability;Monetary policy;Public choice theory
