期刊名称：Cardiff Economics Working Papers / Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
印刷版ISSN：1749-6101
出版年度：2015
期号：7
语种：English
出版社：Cardiff University
摘要：We consider a Bayesian game, namely the Battle of the Sexes with private information, in which each player has two types, High and Low. We allow cheap talk regarding players’ types before the game and prove that the unique fully revealing symmetric cheap talk equilibrium exists for a low range of prior probability of the High-type. This equilibrium has a desirable type-coordination property: it fully coordinates on the ex-post efficient pure Nash equilibrium when the players’ types are different. Type-coordination is also obtained in a partially revealing equilibrium in which only the High-type is not truthful, for a medium range of prior probability of the High-type.
关键词：Battle of the Sexes;Private Information;Cheap Talk;Coordination;Full Revelation
