摘要：Objective: This paper aims to investigate whether the dividend policy is influenced by the shareholding concentration of publicly traded companies in Brazil.Methodology: This research was elaborated through panel regression analysis empirical tests, considering the period from 2013 to 2016.Originality/ Relevance: In Brazil, shareholding is usually concentrated in a small number of shareholders. In this scenario, controlling shareholders often end up having a great influence on management. As a result, agency conflicts may arise (Dalmácio & Corrar, 2007), mainly because controlling shareholders, who have the right to vote, are not always the holders of the preferred shares, which also share dividends (Lopes & Walker, 2008). Thus, according to the Agency Theory, the possibility could be raised of the principal - the controlling shareholder aiming to maximize its individual utility (Martinez, 2001).Main Results: It was verified that there is a positive relationship between the shareholding concentration and the distribution of dividends, that is, the higher the shareholding concentration, the greater the dividend distribution.Contributions: For this research, it were used statistical tests utilizing the panel data regression technique and estimators of Weighted Least Square (WLS), in which were observed the results of the regressions of the total sample (1.440 observations) and four industry sectors, which showed evidence that, there is at least one variable with a statistically significant power (non-cyclical consumption, financial, health, and information technology).
关键词：Shareholding concentration;
Dividends;
Agency Theory
