期刊名称：Journal of Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics
印刷版ISSN：1690-4532
电子版ISSN：1690-4524
出版年度：2021
卷号：19
期号：5
页码：9-14
语种：English
出版社：International Institute of Informatics and Cybernetics
摘要：Free will is sometimes summarised in the philosophical literature as the subjective impression felt by an individual that he or she is the ultimate source or cause of his or her own choices. The two most common arguments for denying the existence of free will come from philosophy and neuroscience. The first argument is the Consequence Argument. The second asserts that our decisions are first made by the brain and only then become conscious to the subject, taking away the control of the decision. The purpose of these two arguments is to demonstrate that an individual cannot be the source or primary cause of his or her choices. It is shown in this work that the concepts of primary cause and primary source are not adequate to state a solid characterisation of free will. A new formulation of this property is proposed in which it is seen as a three-stage decisionmaking process implemented by an individual to escape his or her own real or supposed alienation. This decisionmaking process is represented in the form of a computer model called the Predictability - Suspension - Unpredictability (PSU) model. The compatibility of this new formulation of free will with the feeling it provides and the analysis of various situations are then discussed.
