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  • 标题:Reference Points as Information Frames
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Prateek Goorha
  • 期刊名称:Theoretical Economics Letters
  • 印刷版ISSN:2162-2078
  • 电子版ISSN:2162-2086
  • 出版年度:2015
  • 卷号:05
  • 期号:03
  • 页码:410-414
  • DOI:10.4236/tel.2015.53047
  • 语种:English
  • 出版社:Scientific Research Publishing
  • 摘要:In order to study the idea of a context provided by an informed principal I propose the idea of an information frame. An information frame controls the nature of information that the agent has access to and depends on some simple parameters such as compatibility of interests and complexity of the uncertain parameter. In the process, I define the condition for a feasibly stable information frame for the case of a principal interacting with a single agent as well as with multiple agents.
  • 关键词:Information Frame; Reference Point; Context; Contracts; Principal-Agent
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