期刊名称：Principia : an International Journal of Epistemology
印刷版ISSN：1414-4247
电子版ISSN：1808-1711
出版年度：2022
卷号：26
期号：1
页码：25-38
DOI：10.5007/1808-1711.2022.e85039
语种：English
出版社：Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Brasil
摘要：Philosophical issues often turn into logic. That is certainly true of Moore’s Para-dox, which tends to appear and reappear in many philosophical contexts. There is no doubtthat its study belongs to pragmatics rather than semantics or syntax. But it is also true thatissues in pragmatics can often be studied fruitfully by attending to their projection, so tospeak, onto the levels of semantics or syntax — just in the way that problems in sphericalgeometry are often illuminated by the study of projections onto a plane. To begin I will de-scribe a potentially vast landscape of logics of a certain form, with some illustrations of howthey appear naturally in response to some problems in philosophical logic. Then I will turnMoore’s Paradox into logic, within that landscape, and show how far it can be illuminatedtherein.
关键词：supervaluation;deduction theorem;logic of belief;Moore’s Paradox
