期刊名称：Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
印刷版ISSN：2239-2629
出版年度：2022
卷号：13
期号：2
页码：142-156
DOI：10.4453/rifp.2022.0013
语种：German
出版社：Mimesis Edizioni
摘要：Fueled by the rapid development of neuroscientific tools and techniques, some scholars consider the shift from traditional cognitive psychology toward cognitive neuroscience to be a revolution (most notably Boone and Piccinini). However, the term “revolution” in philosophy of science can easily be construed as involving a paradigm shift in the sense of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Is a Kuhnian account sound in the case at hand? To answer this question, we consider heuristic indicators of two features of paradigm shifts: the incommensurability of ontologies; and a gap between scientific communities. Based on our evidence, we argue that no revolution has occurred (at least, not yet).
