期刊名称：Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
印刷版ISSN：2239-2629
出版年度：2022
卷号：13
期号：2
页码：125-141
DOI：10.4453/rifp.2022.0012
语种：German
出版社：Mimesis Edizioni
摘要：The sciences achieved consensus amongst their practitioners through emancipation from philosophy. In the first half of the 20th century, philosophers began to align themselves with science, and most contemporary philosophers call themselves naturalists. Epistemology was still largely considered a philosophical prerogative until Quine’s paper “Epistemology naturalized” (1969). Opinion is now divided. Ironically, the prodigious work that secured Jean Piaget’s reputation as a cognitive developmental psychologist was actually carried out largely in service of epistemology. Disillusioned with philosophical speculation and with a background in empirical science (Piaget trained as a biologist), Piaget conceived a method based on psychological and historical evidence to investigate epistemological questions scientifically. In this paper, I outline his genetic-epistemological method and locate it in the discourse on naturalism. I conclude by classifying genetic epistemology according to Goldman’s classification of naturalistic epistemologies and by assessing it in the light of criticism typically levelled at naturalistic epistemologies, before highlighting some salient points for a future scientific epistemology.
