摘要：This paper focuses on developing low-carbon technology (LCT) innovation in traditional enterprises under carbon trading policies. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Berman equation quantitatively investigates the coordination mechanism and optimal strategy of LCT innovation systems in conventional industries. A three-way dynamic differential game model is constructed to analyze three cases: the Nash disequilibrium game; the Stackelberg master–slave game; and the cooperative game with the optimal effort of universities, traditional enterprises, and local government, the optimal benefits of the three parties, the region, and the regional LCT level. The results are as follows: (1) by changing the government subsidy factor, carbon trading price, and carbon trading tax rate, the optimal effort of universities and traditional enterprises can be significantly increased; (2) cost-sharing contracts do not change the level of effort of local government to manage the environment, and the use of cost-sharing agreements can change the status of action of universities and enterprises; (3) the optimal effort, optimal benefit, and total system benefit of the three parties and the level of LCT of the industry in the cooperative game are better than those in the non-cooperative case. The combined game achieves the Pareto optimum of the system. The study will contribute to both sustainable business development and environmental sustainability.
关键词：low-carbon technology; carbon trading; subsidy system; differential games
