摘要：In order to discuss the participation selection strategy of relevant subjects in WEEE recycling, a Stackelberg game model of “recyclers—remanufacturers—government” in a WEEE recycling network is constructed, and the system’s stability strategy and conditions are analyzed. Besides this, the direct and indirect effects of recovery time sensitivity, CRMs’ life expectancy sensitivity, and government subsidies on the optimal decision-making of both recyclers and remanufacturers are explored. The results show that the system can achieve a stable and ideal equilibrium, and achieve win–win for all parties, through reasonable profit transfer and cost-sharing. The dual sensitivity of manufacturers’ demand and policy subsidies has the same qualitative impact on the decision variables of the recyclers and remanufacturers. The subsidies vary depending on the CRMs’ recovery effort level of remanufacturers, and these can incentivize the remanufacturers to increase CRMs’ life expectancy. Moreover, a cost-sharing contract between recyclers and remanufacturers can avoid “free-riding” behavior in WEEE recycling. The research can assist in the benefit coordination and behavior adjustment of WEEE recycling members, and provide a theoretical basis for governments to formulate appropriate recycling subsidies to promote the formal recycling of E-waste.
关键词：WEEE recycling network; recovery time sensitivity; CRMs’ life expectancy sensitivity; cost-sharing; Stackelberg model
