摘要：With new energy vehicles becoming the mainstream of new vehicles sold, the surge in user ownership has triggered a wave of power battery scrapping, and the environmental problems caused by improper power battery recycling are becoming more serious. It is essential to promote the development of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) of power batteries effectively through government subsidies under the extended producer responsibility (EPR) regime. Combining the EPR system with the battery manufacturer as the leader and the vehicle manufacturer and the retailer as the subordinates, this paper constructs and solves four models of different CLSC subsidy objects and analyzes the pricing of power batteries by different subsidy objects by using the Stackelberg game, as well as the profit change and profit distribution ratio of each CLSC participant. The results of the study showed: (1) when the unit subsidy is limited, the government should subsidize all the CLSC subjects as much as possible. (2) When the government subsidizes the remanufacturing of power batteries, the recycling rate of power batteries is higher, and the benefits of the CLSC are better than those of subsidizing other actors. (3) The change in government subsidy objects will not affect the profit distribution ratio of CLSC, mainly because the subsidy not only improves the recovery rate, but also improves the profitability of each entity.
关键词：CLSC; Stackelberg game; EPR system; power battery
