出版社：The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
摘要：In this paper, I discuss the problems of ``order in social situations'' using a computer simulation of iterated N -person prisoners' dilemma game. It has been claimed that, in the case of the 2 -person prisoners' dilemma, repetition of games and the reciprocal use of the ``tit-for-tat'' strategy promote the possibility of cooperation. However, in cases of N -person prisoners' dilemma where N is greater than 2, the logic does not work effectively. The most essential problem is so called ``sanctioning problems''. In this paper, firstly, I discuss the ``sanctioning problems'' which were introduced by Axelrod and Keohane in 1986. Based on the model formalized by Axelrod, I propose a new model, in which I added a mechanism of players' payoff changes in the Axelrod's model. I call this mechanism norm-internalization and call our model `` norm-internalization game ''. Second, by using the model, I investigated the relationship between agents' norm-internalization (payoff-alternation) and the possibilities of cooperation. The results of computer simulation indicated that unequal distribution of cooperating norm and uniform distribution of sanctioning norm are more effective in establishing cooperation. I discuss the mathematical features and the implications of the results on social science.
关键词：N -person prisoners' dilemma ; evolutionary game ; sanctioning problem ; norm-internalization
