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  • 标题:Characterizing Strategy-proof, Revenue Monotone Allocation Rules in Auction Mechanisms
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Taiki Todo ; Atsushi Iwasaki ; Makoto Yokoo
  • 期刊名称:人工知能学会論文誌
  • 印刷版ISSN:1346-0714
  • 电子版ISSN:1346-8030
  • 出版年度:2011
  • 卷号:26
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:86-96
  • DOI:10.1527/tjsai.26.86
  • 出版社:The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
  • 摘要:This paper proposes a novel Peer-to-Peer Information Retrieval (P2PIR) method using user feedback and query-destination-learning. The method uses positive feedback information effectively for getting documents relevant to a query by giving higher score to them. The method also utilize negative feedback information actively so that other agents can filter it out with itself. Using query-destination-learning, the method can not only accumulate relevant information from all the member agents in a community, but also reduce communication loads by caching queries and their sender-responder agent addresses in the community. Experiments were carried out on multiple communities constructed with multi-agent framework Kodama . The experimental results illustrated that the proposed method effectively increased retrieval accuracy.
  • 关键词:mechanism design ; game theory ; auctions ; revenue
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