文章基本信息
- 标题：Strategy-proof redistribution mechanisms for budget constrained bidders
- 本地全文：下载
- 作者：Yuko Sakurai ; Makoto Yokoo
- 期刊名称：人工知能学会論文誌
- 印刷版ISSN：1346-0714
- 电子版ISSN：1346-8030
- 出版年度：2011
- 卷号：26
- 期号：1
- 页码：217-227
- DOI：10.1527/tjsai.26.217
- 出版社：The Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
- 摘要：We develop strategy-proof redistribution mechanisms when bidders have budget limitations. The budget limitation is one of realistic constraints for bidders. There have been several redistribution mechanisms under the assumption of quasi-linear utility functions. As a class of strategy-proof redistribution mechanisms, the partition mechanism has been proposed that divides the bidders into two partitions. Furthermore, in multi-unit auction mechanism for budget constrained bidders, a strategy-proof partition mechanism has been developed that can calculate an appropriate threshold price by using bidding information including gross utility and budget limitation.
In this paper, by integrating these techniques, we study partition mechanisms that guarantee strategy-proof and budget balance for budget constrained bidders. There exist the flows of information related to the bidders, redistribution payments, and unsold goods among partitions. We provide a condition on the flows so that a partition mechanism can satisfy strategy-proofness as long as the mechanism applied in each partition is strategy-proof. Furthermore, we develop the three mechanisms as examples that satisfy this condition.
- 关键词：Mechanism design ; Redistribution mechanism ; budget constrained bidders
