摘要：This paper examines the whole role of both board of directors and ownership structure on the effectiveness of executive compensation design in Spanish listed firms. Using a principal-principal agency framework and based on panel data methodology analysis in the period 2004-2011, results show that high level of ownership concentration influence negatively in the executive compensation alignment, having an adverse effect on minority shareholders’ interests. Moreover, evidences show that type of controlling shareholder determines supervisory board effectiveness, which only exert an effective monitoring over executive compensation – increasing variable pay and diminishing fixed salary-, when majority shareholder has not linked to management of the company.
其他摘要：This paper examines the whole role of both board of directors and ownership structure on the effectiveness of executive compensation design in Spanish listed firms. Using a principal-principal agency framework and based on panel data methodology analysis in the period 2004-2011, results show that high level of ownership concentration influence negatively in the executive compensation alignment, having an adverse effect on minority shareholders’ interests. Moreover, evidences show that type of controlling shareholder determines supervisory board effectiveness, which only exert an effective monitoring over executive compensation –increasing variable pay and diminishing fixed salary-, when majority shareholder has not linked to management of the company.
