摘要：This paper is centered upon the analysis of Leniency’s effectiveness in cartel agreements. The influences of this policy on cartel evolution and on the fine mechanism are the main topics to be studied. The first part of the research comprises several theoretical concepts about Competition Policy in the EU and the Commission’s activity towards this scope. A brief description of the general legislation rules and competent regulatory institutions is also included. The research methodology comprises a quantitative and a qualitative analysis. The last part of this paper is represented by a case study. The evolution of cartels before and after the entering into force of this policy is analyzed at a macro-level. Afterwards, a more detailed study, at a micro- level, comprising the behavioral analysis of the cartelist companies and the Leniency’s influence on the fine mechanism is conducted. A synthesis of the micro- level analysis is presented in order to underline the general trend depicted from this study. To a better understanding of the studied concepts, a qualitative analysis, which includes a classification by industry sector and types of goods and services provided by the cartelist companies, was enclosed.
关键词：competition; cartels; evolution; leniency policy; fine mechanism; deterrence; EU.
