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  • 标题:Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Mailath, George ; Morris, Stephen
  • 期刊名称:Theoretical Economics
  • 印刷版ISSN:1555-7561
  • 出版年度:2006
  • 卷号:1
  • 期号:3
  • 页码:311-340
  • 出版社:Econometric Society
  • 摘要:Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in such games. It is always possible to coordinate continuation play by requiring behavior to have bounded recall (i.e., there is a bound L such that in any period, the last L signals are sufficient to determine behavior). We show that, in games with general almost-public private monitoring, this is essentially the only behavior that can coordinate continuation play.
  • 关键词:Repeated games; private monitoring; almost-public monitoring; coordination; bounded recall
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