文章基本信息

标题：Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster’s Procedure
作者：Briata, Federica ; Dall’Aglio, Marco ; Fragnelli, Vito 等
期刊名称：Czech Economic Review
印刷版ISSN：1802-4696
出版年度：2012
卷号：6
期号：3
页码：199-208
出版社：Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies ; CEEOL
摘要：In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.
关键词：Fairness; Knaster’s procedure; complete risk aversion; dynamic coalition formation