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文章基本信息

  • 标题:Financial work incentives for disability benefit recipients: lessons from a randomised field experiment
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Monika Bütler ; Eva Deuchert ; Michael Lechner
  • 期刊名称:IZA Journal of Labor Policy
  • 电子版ISSN:2193-9004
  • 出版年度:2015
  • 卷号:4
  • 期号:1
  • 页码:1-18
  • DOI:10.1186/s40173-015-0044-7
  • 出版社:Springer Verlag
  • 摘要:Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part or all of their benefits if earnings exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). This implicit taxation is considered the prime reason for the low number of beneficiaries who expand work and reduce benefit receipt. We analyse a conditional cash programme that incentivises work related reductions of disability benefits in Switzerland. Four thousand DI beneficiaries received an offer to claim up to CHF 72,000 (USD 77,000) if they expand work and reduce benefits. Initial reactions to the programme announcement, measured by call-back rates, are modest. By the end of the field phase, the take-up rate is only 0.5 %.
  • 关键词:H55 ;J14 ;C93 ;D04 ;Disability insurance ;Field experiment ;Financial incentive ;Return; to; work
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