期刊名称：International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
印刷版ISSN：1550-1329
电子版ISSN：1550-1477
出版年度：2015
卷号：2015
DOI：10.1155/2015/806456
出版社：Hindawi Publishing Corporation
摘要：A commonly encountered problem in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) applications is to reconstruct the state of nature, that is, distributed estimation of a parameter of interest through WSNs’ observations. However, the distributed estimation in autonomous clustered WSNs faces a vital problem of sensors’ selfishness. Each sensor autonomously decides whether or not to transmit its observations to the fusion center (FC) and not be controlled by the fusion center (FC) any more. Thus, to encourage cooperation within selfish sensors, infinitely and finitely repeated games are firstly modeled to depict sensors’ behaviors. Then, the existences of Nash equilibriums for infinitely and finitely repeated games are discussed. Finally, simulation results show that the proposed Nash equilibrium strategies are effective.
