摘要：Using a sample of 680 and 1,300 judicial and private auctions respectively, weanalyze the effect on the wealth of those the law is intended to protect of differentregulations applicable to each type of auctions. We find that consistent with asimple economic model, Courts assign judicial auctions in a discretional manner,and that the assigned auctioneers charge fees which are substantially higher thanthose allowed by law. While this behavior put the intended protection to debtorand creditor at risk, economic theory does not rule out a welfare enhancing effect.We test the hypothesis that the judicial auctions’ design reduces the welfare ofthose intended to protect and, consistent with the predictions of our model, wefind it is more likely for Courts to appoint the less effective auctioneers and thatthe net price received by creditors and debtors in judicial auctions is about 18%to 33% below those that could be obtained in private auctions.
其他摘要：Using a sample of 680 and 1,300 judicial and private auctions respectively, weanalyze the effect on the wealth of those the law is intended to protect of differentregulations applicable to each type of auctions. We find that consistent with asimple economic model, Courts assign judicial auctions in a discretional manner,and that the assigned auctioneers charge fees which are substantially higher thanthose allowed by law. While this behavior put the intended protection to debtorand creditor at risk, economic theory does not rule out a welfare enhancing effect.We test the hypothesis that the judicial auctions’ design reduces the welfare ofthose intended to protect and, consistent with the predictions of our model, wefind it is more likely for Courts to appoint the less effective auctioneers and thatthe net price received by creditors and debtors in judicial auctions is about 18%to 33% below those that could be obtained in private auctions.
