摘要：n this article, I discuss some aspects of the manner in which phenomenology has dealt with the question of the nature of objects of knowledge and the knowability of such objects. I focus on Kant’s phenomenology and consider in particular some ontologi - cal presuppositions that make Kant’s phenomenology both Platonist and anti-Platonist. Then, I make a brief incursion into Hegel’s phenomenological approach and Marx’s critique of Hegel, Kant, and German idealism in general. In the last part of the article, I comment on Marx’s idea of praxis as an entirely new path to tackle the question of the nature and knowability of objects of knowledge. I discuss some of the implications of such an idea for mathematics education. I end up sketching a Hegelian dialectic materialist concept of knowledge that provides room for understanding knowledge as something ineluctably embedded in cultural praxis.
其他摘要：n this article, I discuss some aspects of the manner in which phenomenology has dealt with the question of the nature of objects of knowledge and the knowability of such objects. I focus on Kant’s phenomenology and consider in particular some ontologi - cal presuppositions that make Kant’s phenomenology both Platonist and anti-Platonist. Then, I make a brief incursion into Hegel’s phenomenological approach and Marx’s critique of Hegel, Kant, and German idealism in general. In the last part of the article, I comment on Marx’s idea of praxis as an entirely new path to tackle the question of the nature and knowability of objects of knowledge. I discuss some of the implications of such an idea for mathematics education. I end up sketching a Hegelian dialectic materialist concept of knowledge that provides room for understanding knowledge as something ineluctably embedded in cultural praxis.
