期刊名称：International Journal of Soft Computing and Software Engineering
电子版ISSN：2251-7545
出版年度：2013
卷号：3
期号：3
页码：492-501
DOI：10.7321/jscse.v3.n3.75
出版社：Advance Academic Publisher
摘要：Three-party Password Authenticated Key Exchange (3PAKE) protocols play a key role in providing security goals in communications. They enable two entities to share a common session key in an authentic manner based on a low entropy human-memorable password. In 2010, Lee and Hwang proposed S-IA-3PAKE and S-EA-3PAKE protocols based on the SPAKE protocol developed by Abdalla and Pointcheval. In 2011, Chang et al. presented an efficient three-party Password Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol and its parallel version based on LHL-3PAKE protocol proposed by Lee et al. In this paper, it is shown that both supposedly provably secure S-IA-3PAKE and S-EA-3PAKE protocols are vulnerable to serious threats such as Unknown Key Share (UKS) and password compromise impersonation attacks. It is also shown that the provably secure protocol of Chang et al. and its parallel version suffer from password compromise impersonation and ephemeral key compromise impersonation attacks. Indeed, our results highlight the need of more attention and precision during defining the provable security models and constructing proofs in this method, because there are still considerable gaps between what can be proven based on formal security models and what are actually secure in use.
