期刊名称：THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
印刷版ISSN：2171-679X
出版年度：2015
卷号：30
期号：3
页码：449-463
DOI：10.1387/theoria.13208
语种：English
出版社：UPV/EHU - University of the Basque Country
摘要：According to Helen Longino, objectivity is necessarily social as it depends on critical interactions in community. Justin Biddle argues that Longino’s account presupposes individuals that are completely open to any criticism; as such individuals are in principle able to criticise their beliefs on their own, Longino's account is not really social. In the first part of my paper I argue that even for completely open individuals, criticism for maintaining objectivity is only possible in community. In the second part I challenge Biddle’s interpretation of Longino’s conception of the individual. I conclude that Longino’s account is necessarily social.
其他摘要：According to Helen Longino, objectivity is necessarily social as it depends on critical interactions in community. Justin Biddle argues that Longino’s account presupposes individuals that are completely open to any criticism; as such individuals are in principle able to criticise their beliefs on their own, Longino's account is not really social. In the first part of my paper I argue that even for completely open individuals, criticism for maintaining objectivity is only possible in community. In the second part I challenge Biddle’s interpretation of Longino’s conception of the individual. I conclude that Longino’s account is necessarily social.
