摘要：Axelrod's semina l work de scr ibes circ umsta nces in w hich the goa ls of the for ma l orga niza tion's militar y network become derailed by powerful informal networks built up a mongst soldiers during the First World War. This paper considers payoffs of both informa l soldiers' network and tha t of the formal milita ry burea ucracy. T he paper a ims to a na lyze specific fa ctors a nd circumsta nces tha t a llow informa l netw or ks to domina te for ma l goa ls using a model tha t incorporates analyses regarding: ca lculated pa y-offs, division and homogeneity of la bor, pow ers of sanction, str ength of norms a nd goals, and duration of existence . These aspects are c onsidered in terms of bu rea ucr ac y a nd a dhocra cy and types of su bve rsive group a ctivity. Va riou s te sta ble propositions r ega rding informa l and forma l goals' dominance ar e considered in the discussion of the model.
