摘要：We explain why ʻfrivolous suits (FS)ʼ occur particularly under complete information. Existing analyses such as the ʻtraditionalʼ and the ʻearly-defense-costʼ models are not fully robust in that they either drop the plaintiffʼs withdrawal option or rely on a restrictive assumption that the defendant loses immediately unless he early defends himself at high cost. We pursue a more generalized explanation.We offer an infinite-period litigation model with uncertainty which reflects the reality more consistently.We then show that FS can occur as a subgame perfect equilibrium since the defendant over the pre-trial stage may settle with FS to save future time and/or trial costs.We further demonstrate that FS can occur even under the British rule of fee shifting.
关键词：frivolous suit; negative expected value suit; uncertainty; time cost; settlement;American rule; British rule
