出版社：Philosophy Department, University of Melbourne
摘要：In this paper I want to describe a technique for generating a novel kind of logical semantics, and explore some of its consequences. Some particular cases of this technique are already known, as I shall point out in due course. 1 But as far as I know, no one has noted that there is a general and interesting construction to be had. It would be natural to call the semantics produced by the technique in question `many-valued'; but that name is, of course, already taken. I shall call them, instead, `plurivalent'. In standard logical seman- tics, formulas take exactly one of a bunch of semantic values. I shall call such semantics `univalent'. In a plurivalent semantics, by contrast, formulas may take one or more such values (maybe even less than one, but I set this possibility aside till the last part of this paper). The construction I shall describe can be applied to any univalent semantics to produce a correspond- ing plurivalent one. In this paper I will be concerned with the application of the technique to propositional many-valued (including two-valued) logics. Sometimes, as we shall see, going plurivalent does not change the conse- quence relation; sometimes, as we shall also see, it does. We will explore these possibilities in detail with respect to one small family of many-valued logics
