期刊名称：CREED Working Papers / Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making
出版年度：2014
出版社：Amsterdam
摘要：Previous research has documented strong peer e ects in risk taking, but little is known abouthow such social inuences a ect market outcomes. The consequences of social interactions arehard to isolate in nancial data, and theoretically it is not clear whether peer e ects shouldincrease or decrease risk sharing. We design an experimental asset market with multiple riskyassets and study how exogenous variation in real-time information about the portfolios of peergroup members a ects aggregate and individual risk taking. We nd that peer informationameliorates under-diversi cation that occurs in a market without such information. Onereason is that peer information increases risk aversion and induces a concern for relativeincome position that may reduce or amplify risk taking, depending on whether the contexthighlights the most or least successful trader. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, weshow that social interactions may help to reduce earnings volatility in nancial markets, andwe discuss implications for institutional design.
关键词：peer e ects; laboratory experiments; asset markets
