期刊名称：CREED Working Papers / Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making
出版年度：2015
出版社：Amsterdam
摘要：One acclaimed role of managers is to monitor workers in team productionprocesses and discipline them through the threat of terminatingthem from the team (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). We extend a standardweakest link experiment with a manager that can decide to replace someof her team members at a cost. The amount of contractual commitment(‘termination possibilities’) and the precision of the manager’s monitoringinformation serve as treatment variables. Our results show that the fearof exclusion has a profound effect on team performance even if workersare imperfectly monitored; the most flexible contract induces the highestoutput while the one with no firing possibilities leads to the lowest production.However, once the fear is eliminated for some workers, becausepermanent workers cannot be fired after a probation phase, effort levelssteadily decrease.
