期刊名称：CREED Working Papers / Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making
出版年度：2015
出版社：Amsterdam
摘要：Parties can challenge a judge (request a recusal) when they have reasons to believe that ajudge is not impartial. In practice this procedure is sometimes abused by lawyers who, forexample, want to delay proceedings. Countries have taken different measures to deter theimproper use of the procedure to request a recusal, like fines for dismissed requests, orimmediately dismissing evidently unfounded requests. In a laboratory experiment weexamine the effects of a summary review whether a challenge is evidently unfounded, with orwithout fines. We find that a review without fine improves legal protection in practice as wellas efficiency by reducing unfounded challenges and increasing challenges that have asubstantial chance of success. Overall the number of challenges declines. With a fine,challenges decline, but also legal protection
