期刊名称：CREED Working Papers / Center for Research in Experimental Economics and Political Decision-Making
出版年度：2015
出版社：Amsterdam
摘要：We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemmasettings. Groups of five players play either multi-player trust games or VCM-games on afixed network. Power stems from having the authority to allocate funds raised throughvoluntary contributions by all members and/or from having a pivotal position in the network(centrality). We compare environments with and without ostracism by allowing players insome treatments to exclude others from further participation in the network. Our results showthat power matters but that its effects hinge strongly on the type involved. Reminiscent of theliterature on leadership, players with authority often act more cooperatively than thosewithout such power. Nevertheless, when possible, they are quickly ostracized from the group.Thus, this kind of power is not tolerated by the powerless. In stark contrast, centrality leads toless cooperative behavior and this free riding is not punished; conditional on cooperativeness,players with power from centrality are less likely to be ostracized than those without. Hence,not only is this type of power tolerated, but so is the free riding it leads to
