期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, University of Surrey
出版年度：2014
出版社：University of Surrey
摘要：Many studies suggest that research productivity falls after tenure is granted. Wehave however limited choice-theoretic understanding of why this should occur. Withsome simplifying assumptions, we rationalize this as follows. Scholars are assumedto be “specialists”: their research productivity consists in transforming Ph.D. chaptersinto publishable papers. We show how a department that hired such a scholarprovides incentives to maximize research productivity. We show his research productivityand publication paths are then characterized by a “bang-bang” solution, i.e.,either he works with maximum or minimum effort. The department sets the scholar’swages proportional to the department’s impatience to spur his productivity, and onlysucceeds if he turns out to be more impatient than the department. The paper providesa novel perspective on academic productivity and the tenure system
