期刊名称：Discussion Papers in Economics / Department of Economics, University of Surrey
出版年度：2015
出版社：University of Surrey
摘要：We present a model of transnational terrorism where two countries, home and foreign,face a terrorist threat based in the foreign country. The home country chooses howmuch to invest in defending itself or in reducing terrorist resources either indirectly bysubsidising the foreign country or by directly by intervening itself. We use backwardinduction to solve a multiple stage game where the home country first commits to itspolicy decisions, then the foreign country chooses the effort it expends on reducingterrorist capability and finally, the terrorists decide their effort in attacking in the homeor foreign country. In a numerical solution of the calibrated model, direct interventiononly arises in equilibrium if foreign and home efforts are not close substitutes in thetechnology used to reduce the resources of the terrorist group. A higher relativemilitary efficiency by the home country makes intervention more likely
