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  • 标题:Interpreting Davidson on Intentional Action
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Frederick Stoutland
  • 期刊名称:E-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie
  • 印刷版ISSN:1813-7784
  • 电子版ISSN:1813-7784
  • 出版年度:2014
  • 期号:20
  • 出版社:Charlotte Annerl
  • 摘要:Davidson's early papers on philosophy of action were immensely influential and no doubt largelyresponsible for there being a "standard story": Actionsa are those bodily movements caused andrationalized by beliefs and desires. It is not false to say that Davidson asserted that claim, butproponents of the standard story understand it somewhat differently than he did. His writings, Ishall argue, spawned a widely accepted view that differs from his own in a number of respects.1Wittgensteinian critics of the standard story generally assume that Davidson accepted it, as do itsdefenders, who invariably cite him as their inspiration and often credit him for rooting the story inphysicalism: Jaegwon Kim, for instance, writes that Davidson's "main task has been that of findingfor mind a place in an essentially physical world . . . [in which] we find nothing but bits of matterand increasingIy complex aggregates made up of bits of matter."2
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