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  • 标题:Optimal mechanisms for the control of fiscal deficits
  • 本地全文:下载
  • 作者:Hans Peter Grüner
  • 期刊名称:Euro Area Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics
  • 印刷版ISSN:1830-3420
  • 电子版ISSN:1830-3439
  • 出版年度:2014
  • 出版社:European Central Bank
  • 摘要:This paper shows that a simple two-stage voting mechanism may im-plement a constrained optimal state dependent decision about a …scalde…cit. I consider a setup with strategic …scal de…cits à la Tabellini andAlesina (1990). Three groups of voters are informed about the productiv-ity of current public spending. Voters di¤er in their preferences for publicgoods and swing voters’preferences may change over time. The currentgovernment decides on the current spending mix and it has an incentiveto strategically overspend. Under certain conditions, a simple two-stagemechanism in which a de…cit requires the approval by a supermajorityin parliament implements a constrained optimal decision. When the cur-rent majority is small, bargaining between political parties may furtherincrease social welfare. However, when the current majority is large, asupermajority mechanism with bargaining leads to a biased spending mixand reduces welfare whereas the laissez faire mechanism may yield the…rst best. An appropriately adjusted majority threshold can deal withthis problem.
  • 关键词:Fiscal policy rules; constitutional choice; mechanism de;sign
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