出版社：Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln
摘要：Liberalized electricity markets are characterized by fluctuating priceinelasticdemand of non-storable electricity, often defined by a substantialmarket share held by one or few incumbent firms. These characteristicshave led to a controversial discussion concerning the need for and thedesign of capacity mechanisms, which combine some form of capacity paymentswith price caps in the spot market. The purpose of this study is tounderstand the effects of capacity mechanisms on the market structure.We consider a model with dominant firms and a competitive fringe andinvestigate the impact of price caps and capacity payments on investmentincentives and market concentration. While lower price caps reduce thepotential for the exercise of market power in static models, we find that inthe dynamic model with endogenous investments, lower price caps result inan increase in market concentration, the frequency of capacity withholdingand the profits of the dominant firms.
