出版社：Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln
摘要：To ensure security of supply in liberalized electricity markets, dierent typesof capacity mechanisms are currently being debated or have recently been im-plemented in many European countries. The purpose of this study is to analyzethe cross-border eects resulting from dierent choices on capacity mechanismsin neighboring countries. We consider a model with two connected countriesthat dier in the regulator's choice on capacity mechanism, namely strategicreserves or capacity payments. In both countries, competitive rms invest ingeneration capacity before selling electricity on the spot market. We character-ize market equilibria and nd the following main result: While consumers' costsmay be the same under both capacity mechanisms in non-connected countries,we show that the dierent capacity mechanisms in interconnected countries in-duce redistribution eects. More precisely, we nd that consumers' costs arehigher in countries in which reserve capacities are procured than in countriesin which capacity payments are used to ensure the targeted reliable level ofelectricity.
