期刊名称：Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
印刷版ISSN：1068-5502
出版年度：2015
卷号：40
期号：3
页码：347-364
出版社：WAEA
摘要：This paper analyzes the structure of water transactions using data on contract duration fromCalifornia. Water rights in the western United States are transferred through short-term and longtermleases as well as permanent ownership contracts. We test predictions about the type of watercontracts derived from the literature on economic organization by using ordered probit models toinvestigate the correlates of contract duration.We confirm that long-term and permanent contractsare more likely when investments in specific assets are required for conveyance. We also find thatlonger-term arrangements are common when buyers with uncertain water supplies purchase fromsellers with more certain rights, suggesting that urban municipalities use long-term contracts toreduce risk. We do not find robust evidence supporting the hypothesis that short-term agreementsare more likely when the costs of transfer to third parties are potentially high.
关键词：economic organization; transaction costs; water transaction
